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"[A] patent that is found 'unenforceable' due to a finding of inequitable
conduct is dead."'
I. Introduction
Inequitable conduct, once referred to as "fraud on the Patent Office, '2 is an
affirmative defense to an allegation of patent infringemene with a nuclear end
result-if a court finds inequitable conduct, the patent is void . To succeed on
a claim of inequitable conduct, an accused infringer must prove, by clear and
convincing evidence: (1) a patentee failed to disclose material information or
submitted false material information, and (2) a patentee intended to deceive the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 5 during the patent procurement
process.6 Alleged infringers raise the defense of inequitable conduct in almost
every major patent case, hoping to capitalize on patent applicant oversights in
scientific experimentation and patent prosecution.7
1. Michael D. Kaminski, Effective Management of U.S. Patent Litigation, FoLEY &
LARDNER LLP, Oct. 26, 2005, at 25, http://www.foley.com/files/tbls3lPublications/File
Upload 1 37/2941/Effective%2OManagement%2OoPAo2OUS%20Patent%/20Litigation.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The
charge [of inequitable conduct] was formerly known as 'fraud on the Patent Office,' a more
pejorative term, but the change of name does not make the thing itself smell any sweeter.").
3. See Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality:
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 147-48 (2006) ("[A]n alleged
infringer may assert inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense to patent infringement during
litigation.").
4. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,877 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred,... the entire
patent in question is rendered unenforceable."). Additionally, a finding of inequitable conduct
may also adversely affect patents related to the patent rendered unenforceable. See Mack, supra
note 3, at 153 & n.48 (2006) (citing Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d
804, 809-10 (Fed. Cir. 1990), which held several related patents unenforceable because of
inequitable conduct).
5. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is an agency of the U.S.
Department of Commerce discharged with the duty to examine patent applications and
determine if such applications meet the legal requirements for patentability. General
Information Concerning Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/generalI/index.html
(last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 872 ("Inequitable conduct resides in failure to disclose
material information, or submission of false material information, with an intent to deceive, and
those two elements, materiality and intent, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.").
7. See N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Ci. 1990) ("A
patentee's oversights are easily magnified out of proportion by one accused of infiingement.")
(citations omitted). "Given the ease with which a relatively routine act of patent prosecution can
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Twenty years ago, the Federal Circuit recognized allegations of
inequitable conduct in patent infringement suits as "an absolute plague" and a
"scourge. "9 Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,' decided
en banc, attempted to "put a stop to the mischief associated with defenses of
inequitable conduct."" In a section of the Kingsdown opinion entitled
"Resolution of Conflicting Precedent," the Federal Circuit emphasized that
gross negligence alone does not support a finding of intent to deceive and that
courts should not infer intent to deceive in the absence of "sufficient
culpability."' 2
Fifteen years later, in Hoffmann-La Roche v. Promega Corp.,13 a Federal
Circuit split panel majority upheld two of the lower district court's three
findings of inequitable conduct.' 4 The decision brought a strong dissent from
Judge Newman, who stated that the panel majority wrongly "[found]
misrepresentation in correct science, infer[red] malevolence from verb tense,
and ground[ed] intent to deceive on personal slurs by a hostile witness.' 5 This
Note agrees with Judge Newman that Hoffinann-La Roche marks the return of
be portrayed as intended to mislead or deceive, clear and convincing evidence of conduct
sufficient to support an inference of culpable intent is required." Id.
8. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[U]njustified
accusations of inequitable conduct are offensive and unprofessional.... have been called a
.plague' on the patent system, ... may deprive patentees of their earned property rights, and...
should be condemned.") (citation omitted); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d
1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhe habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major
patent case has become an absolute plague.") (emphasis added); see also 6 DONALD S. Cmsum,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[5][b], at 19-331, 19-331 n.7 (2008) [hereinafter CHisuM ON
PATENTS] (noting Federal Circuit disapproval of the frequency with which accused infringers
raise the inequitable conduct defense and citing additional cases that refer to inequitable
conduct allegations as a "plague" to patent litigation).
9. Kaminski, supra note 1, at 26.
10. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,876-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (concluding that "'gross negligence' does not of itselfjustify an inference of intent to
deceive" and reversing the lower district court's finding of such an intent); see also Ferring B.V.
v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(discussing how Kingsdown attempted to "bring objectivity to charges of inequitable conduct"
to emerge from a national environment in which industrial innovation suffered due to unreliable
patents).
11. See Kaminski, supra note 1, at 26 (discussing the decline in allegations of inequitable
conduct after Kingsdown).
12. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876-77.
13. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(upholding the district court's findings as to two of three categories of asserted inequitable
conduct).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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inequitable conduct jurisprudence to the "misbegotten era" that existed before
Kingsdown. 16 Furthermore, this Note argues that after KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc.,'7 in which the U.S. Supreme Court increased patent law standards
for obviousness,' 8 the Federal Circuit must adopt a heightened standard of
objective recklessness for inferring intent to deceive. Such a standard
eliminates the "ease of opportunistic challenge to the conduct of experimental
science in [the] patent context."' 9
In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the rigidity of the Federal Circuit's
approach to determining nonobviousness,20 one of the requirements for
patentability.2' The Supreme Court called for a more flexible approach to
obviousness determinations and intimated, contrary to Federal Circuit
precedent, that an invention that is "obvious to try" may be rejected as
obvious.22 After KSR, patent examiners can make obviousness rejections where
they previously could not, and, as a result, patent applicants will more
frequently need to advance arguments for patentability.23 Since arguments for
16. See id. at 1372 ("Indeed, [in the past] the prevalence of accusations of inequitable
conduct in patent cases led judges to suspect that all scientists are knaves and all patent
attorneys jackals. Today this court revives that misbegotten era."); see also Kaminski, supra
note 1, at 26 (noting that after "the famous Kingsdown," the defense of inequitable conduct was
much less commonly pled, but that "[i]n more recent years, the defense has been making a
comeback"). "According to a survey published in 2000, patents are held unenforceable in 27%
of the cases in which the [inequitable conduct] defense is decided and that number seems to
have increased since 2000." Id.
17. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1745 (2007) (finding the Teleflex
patent invalid as obvious).
18. See infra Part IV (discussing the KSR decision).
19. Hoffnann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
20. See KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1739 ("We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of
the Court of Appeals.").
21. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
22. See KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1739, 1742 (prescribing a more "expansive and
flexible" inquiry into obviousness and providing that if a solution to a problem in the field of art
is "obvious to try" it is unpatentable as obvious).
23. See Harold C. Wegner, Post-KSR Patent Procurement: Challenges for Biotech,
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, C5's 13m- BI-ANNUAL FORUM ON BIOTECH PATENTING, Sept.
17-18, 2007, at 6 ("Examiners may [now] be able to make out [] prima facie case[s] of
obviousness where, before KSR, this may not have been possible.") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Stephen J. MacKenzie, Supreme Court's KSR v. Teleflex
Decision, May 29, 2007, http://www.wcsr.com/default.asp?id=l 14&biolD=584&objld=241
(last visited Sept. 14, 2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court made it easier... to prove obviousness ....
To overcome these rejections, [an] applicant will have to... rely on declarations from the
inventor or a person of ordinary skill in the art.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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patentability are often the point of attack for alleged infringers claiming
inequitable conduct, the KSR decision makes it imperative for the Federal
Circuit to adopt a higher standard for inferences of intent to deceive.
To establish intent to deceive in an inequitable conduct claim, in the
absence of direct evidence of a subjective intent to deceive, an accused
infringer should have to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a
patentee acted objectively reckless-that the patentee acted in the face of what
the person having ordinary skill in the art (the PHOSITA)24 would recognize as
an objectively high likelihood that the patentee's actions constituted either a
failure to disclose material information, or a submission of false material
information. Such a standard protects patentees from unjustified deprivations
of their property rights and secures investor confidence in commercialization
efforts. 25 Additionally, this standard is both in harmony with developments in
patent law's willful infringement jurisprudence and superior to recent
commentator and congressional suggestions for patent reform.26
This Note examines the issue of inferring intent to deceive the PTO in
inequitable conduct determinations. Part II briefly summarizes the Supreme
Court's KSR decision and discusses its effects on obviousness determinations.
Then, Part IH explores the Federal Circuit case of Hoffinann-La Roche and the
reasoning behind the split panel majority's affirmation of two of the lower
court's three findings of inequitable conduct. Having established the
background, Part IV draws support for an objective recklessness standard for
intent to deceive the PTO from the Federal Circuit's willful infringement
jurisprudence and analyzes recent suggestions for patent reform and for
addressing patentee concerns post-KSR. Part V applies an objective
recklessness standard to two inequitable conduct cases cited with Hoffnann-La
Roche as evidence of an unfortunate Federal Circuit trend toward low standards
24. Patent law often utilizes the objective standard of the "person having ordinary skill in
the art," the PHOSITA. See, e.g., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141 (8th ed.,
2001) [hereinafter MPEP]. "The hypothetical 'person having ordinary skill in the art' to which
the claimed subject matter pertains would, of necessity have the capability of understanding the
scientific and engineering principles applicable to the pertinent art." Id. (citation omitted). "A
person of ordinary skill in the art is... presumed to be one who thinks along the lines of
conventional wisdom in the art." ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 177
(7th ed. 2005).
25. The patent system incentivizes, among other things, invention and the investment in,
and commercialization of, inventions. See HARMON, supra note 24, at 11-13 (discussing the
purpose of the patent system). Inventors are less likely to invent and investors are less likely to
invest in commercialization if patent protection is void in the face of baseless allegations of
inequitable conduct.
26. See infra Part IV (discussing the Federal Circuit's willful infringement jurisprudence
and suggested patent reforms).
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for inferences of intent. Finally, in Part VI, this Note concludes that the Federal
Circuit should adopt an objective recklessness standard for inferences of intent
to deceive the PTO.
II. Nonobviousness, KSR. and the Aftermath
A patent grants a patentee "the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling [the patentee's] invention. 2 7 With the exceptions of
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas, which are unpatentable,
"[t]he classes of [patentable] subject matter taken together include practically
everything that is made by man and the processes for making the products."28
To be patentable, an invention must be new,
29 useful, 30 and nonobvious a.3
The Supreme Court's KSR decision raised the bar for patentability by
raising the standards for nonobviousness, 32 "the most important and most
litigated of the conditions of patentability. 33 In KSR, Teleflex Incorporated
(Teleflex), the exclusive licensee of the patent at issue, sued KSR International
Company (KSR) for infringement.34 KSR argued that Teleflex's patent was
invalid as obvious.35 The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's ruling
that Teleflex's patent was valid, deciding that the Federal Circuit erred in its
rigid application of the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test36 (the TSM
test).3' The Federal Circuit had focused on the need to make specific findings
27. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
28. General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 5.
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (providing patent law's novelty requirements).
30. See id. § 101 (requiring an invention to be "useful"); id. § 112 (requiring thatapatent
applicant disclose "the manner and process of making and using [the invention]") (emphasis
added).
31. See id. § 103(a) (describing conditions for patentability and nonobvious subject
matter).
32. See Wegner, supra note 23, at 3 ("KSR represents a huge signal to the patent
community that the standards of patentability in the past have been too low and that both the
PTO and the courts need to observe higher standards.") (emphasis in original).
33. 2 CHisuM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 5.06, at 5-735.
34. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007).
35. Id.
36. KSR Int'I Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1734 ("Under [the TSM test] a patent claim is only proved
obvious if 'some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings' can be found in
the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the
art.") (citations omitted).
37. See id. at 1739 ("We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.").
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of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art38-4he information
existing in the public domain as of the inventor's date of invention.39 This
interpretation, however, can run counter to patent law's nonobviousness
requirement, which seeks to grant patents only to "those inventions that in fact
serve to advance the state of the useful arts,"40 by making it difficult for
examiners to reject obvious inventions for which no specific findings of a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art can be found. Thus, the
Court stated that rigid application of the TSM test was inconsistent with its
analysis enunciated in Graham v. John Deere Co. ofKansas City,41 which sets
forth a more "expansive and flexible" inquiry into obviousness.42 The Court
38. The Federal Circuit held:
[T]he district court erred as a matter of law by applying an incomplete teaching-
suggestion-motivation test to its obviousness determination. The correct standard
requires a court to make specific findings showing a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine prior art teachings in the particular manner claimed by the
patent at issue.
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
39. See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 564 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (discussing what constitutes prior art), rev don other grounds, 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). The National Steel Car court stated:
Items included as prior art are: (1) inventions that were patented or described in a
printed publication from anywhere in the world before the patent applicant's date of
invention; (2) inventions used or known by others in the United States before the
applicant's date of invention; (3) inventions that were in public use or on sale in the
United States more than one year prior to the date of the patent application;
(4) inventions described in another United States patent application filed before the
applicant's date of invention; (5) inventions granted a patent after a filing of a
United States patent application before the applicant's date of invention; (6) subject
matter sought to be patented that was not invented by the applicant; and
(7) inventions of another that were made in the United States and not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed before the applicant's date of invention.
Id.
40. 2 CmsuM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 5.01, at 5-10-11. "A patent monopoly may
issue only for those literally new solutions that are beyond the grasp of the ordinary artisan who
had a full understanding of the pertinent prior art." Id. at 11.
41. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966), where the
Court held:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
Id.
42. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) (discussing the
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noted that the TSM test actually captures a "helpful insight"--that a patent is
not obvious solely because each element in the patent is already known in the
prior art-but also that the TSM test is incompatible with precedent when
applied as a rigid and mandatory formula.43
Encouraging an influx of common sense into obviousness determinations,
the Court recognized that "[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton"44 and explained that obviousness
analyses need not seek out aprecise teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the
prior art.45 In a further departure from Federal Circuit precedent,46 the Court
provided that if a solution to a problem in the field of art is obvious to try, it is
likely the product of ordinary skill and common sense, not of innovation, and
therefore unpatentable as obvious.47 The Court's invocation and application of
an "obvious to try" standard and the Court's mandated, more flexible approach
to the TSM test raise the bar for patentability and nonobviousness.48
Graham analysis). Additionally, note that patent law's nonobviousness requirement is codified
in 35 U.S.C. § 103, which provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Pursuant to Section 103 and the Graham analysis, in making prima
facie obviousness determinations, patent examiners must: "(A) Determin[e] the scope and
contents of the prior art; (B) Ascertain[] the differences between the prior art and the claims in
issue; (C) Resolv[e] the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (D) Evaluat[e] evidence
of secondary considerations." MPEP, supra note 24, at § 2141.
43. KSRInt'lCo.,127S. Ct. at1741.
44. Id. at 1742.
45. See id. at 1741 ("[A] court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ."). "Common sense teaches.., that familiar
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of
ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a
puzzle." Id. at 1742.
46. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed.Cir. 1995) ("'Obvious to try' has long been
held not to constitute obviousness.").
47. KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
48. See Exparte Kubin, APPEAL 2007-0819, 2007 WL 2070495, at *5 (B.P.A.I. May
31, 2007) (affirming a patent examiner obvious rejection under the new KSR regime). The court
noted:
[W]e note the Supreme Court recently cast doubt on the viability of Deuel to the
extent the Federal Circuit rejected an "obvious to try" test .... Under KSR, it's now
apparent "obvious to try" may be an appropriate test in more situations than we
previously contemplated.... [Here], [t]he "problem" facing those in the art was to
isolate NAIL cDNA, and there were a limited number of methodologies available to
do so. The skilled artisan would have had reason to try these methodologies with
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Following KSR, the PTO issued a notice containing new examination
guidelines for patent examiners.49 The PTO provided a nonexhaustive list of
rationales to support rejections based on obviousness, including the TSM test
and "obvious to try," and discussions of each rationale. 0 The PTO drew
directly from KSR to explain the "obvious to try" rationale.5 ' In discussing the
TSM test, the PTO provided that "[t]he courts have made clear that the
teaching, suggestion, or motivation test is flexible and an explicit suggestion to
combine the prior art is not necessary. 5 2 As a result of the KSR decision, and
with the support of the PTO's revised guidelines, "[e]xaminers may [now] be
able to make out [] primafacie case[s] of obviousness where, before KSR, this
may not have been possible.0
3
In KSR, the Court did not address the issue at the heart of this Note. KSR
did not solve the issue of inferring intent to deceive in inequitable conduct
determinations. However, KSR is important to this Note because heightened
nonobviousness standards will result in more arguments for patentability, 4 and
alleged infringers' claims of inequitable conduct often attack patentability
arguments.55
III. Inequitable Conduct and Hoffinann-La Roche: An Improperly
Inferred Intent to Deceive
Hoffinann-La Roche exemplifies the problems the defense of inequitable
conduct can pose, 6 and it has been cited as the first step in a reversion to a low
the reasonable expectation that at least one would be successful. Thus, isolating
NAIL cDNA was "the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common
sense," leading us to conclude NAIL cDNA is not patentable as it would have been
obvious to isolate it.
Id.
49. Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in View
of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57,526
(Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Examination Guidelines].
50. See generally id. at 57,528-34.
51. See id. at 57,532 (discussing the "Obvious to Try" rationale).
52. Id. at 57,534.
53. Wegner, supra note 23, at 6.
54. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the increased need for
submissions of Section 132 affidavits to overcome obviousness rejections, which are now easier
to make).
55. See Wegner, supra note 23, at 6 n.13 ("[F]iling any declaration . .. will open the door
to hindsight criticism ..... (emphasis in original)).
56. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J.
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standard for inferring intent to deceive and as a harbinger of both "the return of
the inequitable conduct plague" and of an "open season for patent litigation.
5 7
In Hoffinann-La Roche, Hoffmann-La Roche brought a patent infringement
action against Promega, but Promega counterclaimed, asserting inequitable
conduct.58 The invention at issue was an enzyme used in DNA replication,59
and the district court held the patent on that invention to be unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct.6° The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court finding
that Cetus, the small biotechnology start-up company that developed, patented,
and licensed the technology to Hoffinann-La Roche, had engaged in inequitable
conduct during the prosecution of the patent.61 As a result, the patent was
invalid, and Hoffinann-La Roche lost its license and faced antitrust suits for
licensing a patent obtained by fraud.62
The district court in Hoffinann-La Roche based its findings of inequitable
conduct on representations Cetus made concerning: (1) the invention's
molecular weight; (2) an experimental example which was written in the past
tense although it had never been performed exactly as written; and
(3) comparative differences between Cetus's invention and inventions
described by prior art references, specifically, differences in fidelity and
template dependence.63 Cetus advanced these representations in a Section 132
MARSHALL REv. INTEL. PROP. L. 318, 345 (2006) (citing Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega
Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
57. See James E. Hanft & Stacey S. Kerns, The Return of the Inequitable Conduct
Plague: When "IDid Not Know" Unexpectedly Becomes "You Should Have Known," 19 No.2
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1-2, 5 (2007) (discussing Hoffmann-La Roche and noting a
reversion in the Federal Circuit's inequitable conduct jurisprudence back to a lower standard for
inferring intent).
58. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
59. See id. at 1358-59 (describing the invention at issue); see also Holman, supra note
56, at 345 ("The [Hoffmann-La Roche] case involved the patent covering Taq polymerase, a
thermostable DNA polymerase used in performing Polymerase Chain Reaction ('PCR').").
PCR allows scientists to generate many copies of DNA from a small amount of DNA.
Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1357-58. PCR has led to advances in molecular biology and
has been useful in pathology and in identifying trace amounts of blood and hair. Id. at 1358.
The "Taq" polymerase is derived from the Thermus aquaticus bacterium and is useful in PCR
because Taq is active and stable at high temperatures. Id. By using Taq, scientists can make
PCR much faster and more efficient. Id.
60. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., No. C-93-1748 VRW, 1999 WL
1797330, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1999).
61. Holman, supra note 56, at 345.
62. Id. at 345-46; see also Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc., 402
F. Supp. 2d 276, 289 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying Hoffinann-La Roche's motion to dismiss
Molecular Diagnostics Laboratories' complaint alleging antitrust violations).
63. See Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (discussing the grounds on which the district court based its findings of inequitable
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declaration," arguing for patentability to overcome an examiner's rejection for
anticipation/obviousness. 65 The Federal Circuit ultimately upheld the district
court's findings of inequitable conduct with respect to Cetus's arguments
concerning comparative differences between its invention and the inventions
described in prior art references and with respect to Cetus's use of the past
tense in a purely prophetic example. 66 In doing so, the Federal Circuit
implicitly approved a low standard for inferences of an intent to deceive the
PTO and only provided more "grist for [the] pernicious mill" of inequitable
conduct allegations.67 The reasoning behind each decision is discussed
below, 68 but before examining the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Hoffimann-La
Roche, it is important to note a few significant attributes of inequitable conduct
jurisprudence.
conduct). The court stated:
A DNA polymerase is said to be "template dependant" if it has the ability to read
the identity of a nucleotide in the template strand of DNA and then synthesize the
appropriate complementary base pair. Fidelity relates to the accuracy of the DNA
polymerase in adhering to the complementary base-pairing during synthesis.
Id. at 1368.
64. Patent applicants submit rebuttal evidence in affidavits or declarations under 37
C.F.R. § 1.132. 2 CHisuM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 5.06[l][b][i], at 5-743; 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 (2007). Section 1.132 provides: "When any claim of an application or a patent under
reexamination is rejected or objected to, any evidence submitted to traverse the rejection or
objection on a basis not otherwise provided for must be by way of an oath or declaration under
this section." Id. Section 132 affidavits or declarations present two types of evidence:
(1) evidence of"'unexpectedly superior properties or advantages' of the claimed invention as
compared with the prior art products or processes," and (2) evidence of"commercial success,
long-felt need and other 'secondary considerations."' See 2 CHIsuM ON PATENTS, supra note 8,
§ 5.06[l][b][i], at 5-743-44 (discussing factual showings under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132). After
submission of rebuttal evidence or argument, patentability is determined by preponderance of
the evidence, based on the whole record, with due consideration to the rebuttal's persuasiveness.
2 CHISUM ON PATENTs, supra note 8, § 5.06[1][a], at 5-740.
65. See Hoffimann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1359 (describing Cetus's argument for
patentability). In an obviousness determination, the PTO bears the initial burden of proving that
a claimed invention is "prima facie obvious." 2 CHiSuM ON PATENTS,supra note 8, § 5.06[ 1][a],
at 5-735. If an examiner establishes a case of prima facie obviousness, the burden shifts to the
patent applicant to put forth evidence or to advance an argument in support of the claimed
invention's patentability. See HARMON, supra note 24, at 215 (providing that after a PTO
examiner makes a prima facie case of obviousness, the patent applicant is then "obliged to come
forward with rebuttal, which is merely a showing of facts supporting the opposite conclusion").
66. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1359-60 (upholding the district court's findings
of inequitable conduct in Cetus's arguments concerning Taq polymerase's fidelity and the
inventors' use of the past tense in Example VI).
67. See id. at 1372 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that the complexities of science
provide "grist for [the] pernicious mill" of inequitable conduct claims).
68. See infra Part III.A-B (analyzing the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Hoffimann-La
Roche).
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Courts recognize that materiality and intent are distinct elements and
that an alleged infringer must prove both elements to prevail on a claim of
inequitable conduct. 69 But alleged infringers can prove intent to deceive
the PTO by circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of such intent
is rare.70 Further, materiality and intent are inversely related, so "[i]f the
information involved is highly material to patentability, the level of intent
required to sustain an inequitable conduct finding is proportionally less,"
7
and arguments for patentability are presumed material.72 Additionally, the
PTO cannot run its own tests to verify data from comparative testing-the
most commonly advanced evidence of unexpected results submitted in
Section 132 affidavits or declarations-so "this area breeds more problems
with fraud and inequitable conduct than any other. 7 3 The presumptive
materiality of patentability arguments coupled with the inverse relationship
of materiality and intent encourages findings of inequitable conduct that are
69. See Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("[M]ateriality does not presume intent, which is a separate and essential component of
inequitable conduct." (citations omitted)).
70. See Scott D. Anderson, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and
Recommended Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 845,857-58 (1999) (discussing judicial treatment
of the intent prong of inequitable conduct analysis).
71. Mack, supra note 3, at 155.
72. See, e.g., Progressive Games, Inc. v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1283
(D. Nev. 1999) ("Where false or misleading affidavits or documents are submitted to overcome
a prior art rejection by a patent examiner, the requisite materiality may be presumed."); Upjohn
Co. v. MOVA Pharm. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217 (D.P.R. 1998) ("A false or misleading
declaration submitted to the PTO is ipsofacto material."), rev'd on other grounds, 225 F.3d
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Refac Int'l Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 887 F. Supp. 539, 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) ("[M]ateriality is presumed when false affidavits are submitted to the PTO in order to
overcome the rejection of a patent application."), affid, 81 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2007) (providing the PTO regulation regarding materiality). Section
1.56(b) provides:
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to information
already of record or being made of record in the application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie
case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability
Id.; see also 6 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 19.03[2] [d], at 19-210 n. 102 (citing many
cases supporting the proposition that the materiality of information disclosed in Section 132
affidavits or declarations may be presumed).
73. See 6 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 19.03[2][d], at 19-209-10 (discussing
Section 132 affidavits and inequitable conduct).
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unsupported by a thorough analysis of whether the requisite intent to
deceive exists. Hoffmann-La Roche provides an example.
A. Experimental Examples and Verb Tense
In applying for the patent at issue in Hoffmann-La Roche, Cetus, the
inventors, included Example VI, the description of an experimental
procedure.74 Cetus wrote Example VI in the past tense, but it never
performed the example from start to finish as written. 75 Although an
example written in past tense generally denotes actual performance, a not-
yet performed experimental example may be written in the present tense as
a prophetic example. 76 Hoffmann-La Roche argued that Cetus included
Example VI in the patent application to satisfy the requirement of
disclosure of the best mode of practicing the invention.77 The majority,
however, disagreed: "The best mode requirement.., does not entitle the
inventor to suggest that the best mode has been performed when it has not,
and to report results that have not actually been observed. 78 The majority
found use of the past tense to be a material misrepresentation and then
found intent to deceive because the inventors attested that all statements in
the patent application were true. 79 Dissenting, Judge Newman pointed out
that Example VI was scientifically accurate, was a faithful representation of
the experiments actually run, and was indisputably supported by
experimental data. 0
74. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (discussing Example VI, a procedure for refining a bacterial culture of the Taq enzyme).
75. Id. at 1364.
76. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at 2.
77. Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1367; see generally 35 U.S.C. §112 (2000) ("The
specification shall contain a written description of the invention.... and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.").
78. Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1367.
79. Id. It is worth noting that declarations filed in the PTO allow inventors to declare that
information submitted is true, or believed to be true. See generally MPEP, supra note 24, at
§ 602. The MPEP provides an example declaration which requires patent applicants to sign a
statement reading, "I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are
true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true .... " Id.
(emphasis added).
80. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority's treatment of Example VI). Judge
Newman states:
Example VI as written was a combination of the chromatographic columns of two
purification sequences designated as Prep 3 and Prep 4.... The fatal flaw,
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Initially, the use of the past tense for an example that was not actually
performed exactly as written might appear to provide valid grounds for
inferring intent to deceive. Instinctively, most people do not hesitate long
before attributing intent to deceive to a person who claims to have done
something which that person never did. However, in patent law, the issue
of tense is not as crystal clear.
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) permits the use
of prophetic or paper examples, in which an example is written in the
present tense,8' and actually cites Hoffmann-La Roche for the proposition
that prophetic examples should never be written in the past tense.
82
Determinations of inequitable conduct, however, should turn on more than
just improper tense choice; intent to deceive must be shown.8 3 Even if a
patent applicant was negligent, or grossly negligent, in submitting
prophetic examples in the past tense, such negligence alone does not
provide a sufficient basis for inferring an intent to deceive the PTO.
84
In Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,85 only four
years prior to Hoffmann-La Roche, the Federal Circuit found no inequitable
conduct despite experimental examples written in the past tense that
according to the panel majority, is that the entire Example VI was not written in the
present tense .... The inventors believed, and so testified, that the combination of
Preps 3 and 4 would be an optimum procedure, and added it to the disclosure
because it was their best mode.... The ascribed material misrepresentation is not
the data in the example, but only the use of the past tense. It was not disputed that
the procedure and results of Example VI were supported by Roche's experimental
data. There was no proffered evidence of deceptive intent, or basis for such an
inference, and no contradiction to the evidence that Example VI was added because
the inventors believed it to be the best mode.
Id.
81. See generally MPEP, supra note 24, at § 608.01(q).
82. See id. ("No results should be represented as actual results unless they have actually
been achieved. Paper examples should not be described using the past tense.") (citing
Hoffmnann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1367).
83. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1377 (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing the
majority's analysis of Example VI). "[P]atentability does not depend on whether [an] example
was actually conducted. The presentation of accurate 'constructive' descriptive and enabling
information in the specification, whether or not marked as 'prophetic,' is not material
misrepresentation with culpable intent." Id.
84. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,876 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("[A] finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of itself
justify an inference of intent to deceive.").
85. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(concluding that the patent applicant did not engage in inequitable conduct by misrepresenting
type of plasmid used in examples of patent application).
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differed from the experiments actually performed.86 In Regents, Eli Lilly,
challenging the patent at issue, did not claim that the written examples
were inoperative, only that they should not have been written in the past
tense.87 The court held that no inequitable conduct occurred because
"[t]here [was] no reason to believe that a reasonable examiner would have
made any different decision if [the University of California] had framed
Examples 4 and 5 as constructive examples."
88
Whereas the court in Regents based its decision on a lack of
materiality, the court in Hoffmann-La Roche addressed intent to deceive
instead because Cetus cited Example VI in asserting differences between its
claimed enzyme and the prior art in an argument for patentability.89 Such
arguments for patentability may be presumed to be material. 9° Thus, Cetus
cited information that was arguably misrepresented but likely not material
outside of an argument for patentability, in accord with Regents. The panel
majority in Hoffmann-La Roche concluded, however, that such action
constituted clear and convincing evidence of an intent to deceive the PTO.
By writing all the examples in the present tense, Cetus would have avoided
a finding of intent to deceive and inequitable conduct.9'
A patent's enforceability should not turn so quickly on tense choice. It
is difficult to support the Hoffmann-La Roche decision concerning
86. See id. at 1571 ("The misidentification of the plasmid was... not material to
patentability. Thus, no inequitable conduct occurred in the procurement of the patent.").
87. See id. at 1570 ("Lilly does not argue that the pMB9 plasmid was inoperable in the
stated examples, only that Examples 4 and 5 should not have been stated as actual examples
(even though they presumably could have been stated as constructive, i.e., hypothetical,
examples).").
88. Id.
89. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (discussing Cetus's two-part argument for patentability).
90. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of materiality
for information advanced in arguments for patentability).
91. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont De Nemours &Co., 750 F.2d 1569,1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (rejecting Du Pont's allegation of inequitable conduct). There, the court stated:
Du Pont argues that Atlas committed inequitable conduct by failing to tell the
examiner that the examples were "prophetic" and, hence, in misleading the
examiner into believing that the examples were actually performed. However, the
district court found that the examples were written in the present tense to conform
with the PTO requirements on prophetic examples. Moreover, the district court
found that all but one of the examples were based on actual experiments and only
slightly modified to reflect the inventor's notion of the most effective formulation.
Consequently, the district court found, there was no intent on the part of Atlas to
mislead the PTO.
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Example VI, where the past tense example cited is operable 92 and "only
slightly modified to reflect the inventor's notion of the most effective
formulation. 93 The district court in Hoffinann-La Roche stated: "The fact that
Example VI may have been a superior method of purification is irrelevant: It
had not been performed as written, the inventors knew that it had not been
performed as written .... Under these circumstances... the inventors'
misrepresentation was intentional. " 94  Such an approach ignores the
requirement that allegedly inequitable conduct must be "viewed in light of all
the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, [and] must indicate
sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.
95
Further, the district court's approach implies that trivial attacks on
experimental procedures written in the past tense are acceptable bases for
inequitable conduct allegations.96 "Example VI was.., written for use by
manufacturers, and had been given to those manufacturers as instructions for
commercial scale purification of [the invention]. 97 Further, Example VI was
not the only example written in the past tense in the patent application.98 Cetus
wrote all of the examples described in the specification in the past tense. 99 If
Example VI was the only example written in the past tense, then such a unique
tense choice might provide supportable grounds for inferring intent to deceive.
Id. The court also exhibited no hesitation affirming the district court's finding of
nonobviousness, which relied on the prophetic examples in the patent specification as evidence
of differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. See id. at 1576 (providing the
court's conclusion on nonobviousness).
92. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1379 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The district
court agreed that the properties of the Taq polymerase described in Example VI were not
significantly different from the properties of the products of Prep 3 or Prep 4."); see also
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., No. C-93-1748 VRW, 1999 WL 1797330, at *14
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1999) (discussing the results of Prep 3 and Prep 4).
93. Atlas Powder Co., 750 F.2d at 1578.
94. Hoffmann-La Roche, 1999 WL 1797330, at *9.
95. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
96. See Hoffinann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1375-76 (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing
the experiment VI details which the panel majority described as misrepresentations). The panel
majority designated a number of steps described in Example VI, in the past tense, as
misrepresentations because they had not been run as written. Id. Judge Newman described the
majority's criticisms as "trivial" and "devoid of even the accusation, much less proof, of
deceptive intent" because the experimental steps designated as misrepresentations were actually
run; they were just run in Prep 3, not in a conducted-as-written Example VI. Id.
97. See id. at 1376.
98. See generally U.S. Patent No. 4,889,818 (filed June 17, 1987), available at




The analysis of Example VI's tense in Hoffinann-La Roche illustrates a
lowering of traditional standards for finding intent, which will "result[] in more
findings of inequitable conduct ostensibly without the requisite scienter."
' °
The treatment of Cetus's representations concerning differences between the
claimed invention and the inventions described in the prior art is also
problematic because the arguments for patentability advanced by Cetus are
similar to arguments that patent applicants will frequently need to advance to
meet KSR's heightened standards for patentability.'0 '
B. Comparative Differences Between the Invention and the Prior Art
In arguing for patentability, Cetus asserted that actual differences existed
between its invention and the invention described in two prior art journal
articles. 102 The panel majority conceded that Cetus's statements about its
invention were accurate;'0 3 however, it accepted the district court's finding that
Cetus's statements comparing its invention to the prior art were inaccurate.l14
Hoffmann-La Roche argued that the inventors characterized the prior art based
on their interpretation of results of experiments involving the prior art and the
claimed invention and that no finding of inequitable conduct could be
supported solely on the basis of expert testimony that advanced a contradictory
interpretation.'15 Rejecting this, the majority upheld the district court and
concluded that Cetus misrepresented the prior art invention as compared with
Cetus's invention.
10 6
100. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at 1.
101. See supra Part II (discussing KSR and its effect on patent examinations).
102. See Hoffnann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (discussing the inventors' comparison of the fidelity and template dependency of the
claimed enzyme and the prior art enzymes). Both prior art journals described a DNA
polymerase derived from the Taq bacterium. Id. Cetus claimed that its Taq enzyme exhibited
higher fidelity and template dependence than the prior art enzymes, which experienced
misincorporation. Id. at 1369.
103. See id. at 1369 ("[T]he applicants' statements about the fidelity of their own enzyme
were accurate .... ).
104. See id. ("[Tihe statements characterizing the activity of the prior art enzymes and
comparing it to that of the claimed enzyme were inaccurate.").
105. See id. at 1370 (rejecting Hoffnann-La Roche's argument that the inventors and
Promega's expert witness simply differed over how to interpret experimental results involving
the prior art and claimed enzymes).
106. See id. at 1371 ("[T]he inventors misrepresented the prior art enzyme and its activity
as compared to that of the claimed enzyme.").
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The district court stated that Cetus could have replicated the experiments
of the two prior art journals and found the failure to do so to be "persuasive
evidence" of intent to deceive the PTO. 0 7 The Federal Circuit did not
expressly endorse the district court's imposition of a duty to replicate, stating,
in a footnote, "[w]e do not suggest that an applicant is required to repeat the
experiments of the prior art; an applicant, however, may not knowingly
misrepresent those experiments or their results."' 08 In upholding the district
court's finding of inequitable conduct, however, the majority gave great weight
to Promega's expert witness, Dr. Kunkel. 109 Dr. Kunkel stated that "[Cetus]
should have duplicated the prior art in order to conduct a side-by-side
comparison."" 0 Additionally, he called Cetus a fraud, and he described Cetus's
activities as "scientific misconduct" and "intentional misrepresentations.""'
In disagreeing with the panel majority's reliance on Dr. Kunkel's
testimony, Judge Newman noted that it was undisputed that the inventors
accurately presented their data' 12 and that there was no evidence that the data in
the prior art publications was incorrect. 1 3 Specifically, Judge Newman stated:
"It is not a material misrepresentation with intent to deceive, for an inventor to
use his/her knowledge and experience to reach a reasonable conclusion,"' 14 and
"[a] hostile witness' flashy challenge to the inventor's integrity is not probative
of anything."" 5
C. Deciphering Hoffmann-La Roche
Perhaps the split panel Federal Circuit decision in Hoffinann-La Roche
can best be attributed to the clearly erroneous standard of review the Federal
Circuit applies to lower court determinations of materiality and intent."16 The
107. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., No. C-93-1748 VRW, 1999 WL
1797330, at * 13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1999) (focusing on Cetus's failure to conduct experiments
which would provide a "side-by-side comparison" between Cetus's invention and that of the
prior art).
108. Hoffinann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1371 n.4.
109. Id. at 1369-72 (discussing Dr. Kunkel's testimony and noting that the district court
found intentional deception based primarily on testimony from Dr. Kunkel).
110. Id. at 1380 (Newman, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1381.
113. Id. at 1379.
114. Id. at 1380.
115. Id. at 1381.
116. See 6 CmsuM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 19.03[5][c], at 19-333 ("Because most
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panel majority repeatedly cited the clearly erroneous standard of review
throughout its opinion. 1 7 Pursuant to such a standard, Federal Circuit reviews
of lower court decisions of fact are deferential. Whether the split panel
decision should be impugned or may be explained away on standard of review
grounds, Hoffinann-La Roche evidences an undesirably low standard for
inferences of intent to deceive. After Hoffinann-La Roche, a patent applicant
who relies on prior art representations, experiments, or results without
duplicating the prior art experiments, or who describes examples in the
specification in the past tense, leaves himself vulnerable to allegations that he
"knew better," 18 and "inequitable conduct can be found by using an expert and
20-20 hindsight in questioning an inventor's use of his [] knowledge and
experience in reaching a conclusion about the prior art."" 
9
Regarding experiment replication, a patent applicant will find it difficult to
effectively replicate the prior art because accused infringers will always be able
to point to differences between a prior art experiment and the experiment run
by the patent applicant. For example, in Cetus's case, there were differences in
laboratory equipment, initial salt concentrations, and type of matrix used in size
exclusion chromatography.120 An accused infringer's ability "to ascertain what
experiments were not done, and then to argue that they should have been
done,"'121 should not subject patents to a risk of invalidation for inequitable
conduct. Nor should tense choice be determinative in establishing the requisite
intent to deceive for findings of inequitable conduct.
The requirement of a higher, objective recklessness standard for inferring
intent to deceive would likely produce a different result in Hoffinann-La Roche
at the district court level. A court, faced with the circumstances in Hoffinann-
La Roche, would likely reject the argument that there was clear and convincing
issues relating to fraud and inequitable conduct are essentially questions of fact, appellate courts
will not disturb findings by the trial court unless clearly erroneous." (citations omitted)).
117. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ("With [the clearly erroneous] standard of review in mind, we turn to each of the grounds
on which the district court based its ruling."). "There is no clear error in that determination."
Id. at 1366. "The court's determination [of materiality] is not clearly erroneous." Id. at 1368.
"The district court did not clearly err in finding the requisite intent." Id. at 1372.
118. See id. at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Dr. Kunkel's charge that [the lead Cetus
inventor] 'knew better' is mysterious indeed."). The district court found as fact that the
inventors believed that the prior art and the claimed enzyme were different, and no error was
asserted in that finding. Id.
119. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at 2.
120. See Hoffnann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1360-62 (discussing the differences between the
Cetus and prior art experiments).
121. Id. at 1379 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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evidence that, in arguing for patentability, Cetus acted objectively recklessly-
that Cetus acted in the face of what the PHOSITA would recognize as an
objectively high likelihood that such argument constituted either a failure to
disclose material information, or a submission of false material information.
Cetus did improperly choose to submit a prophetic example in the past tense,
but the example was scientifically accurate.' 22  Cetus also relied on
representations in prior art journal articles without experimental replication, but
there is no duty to replicate prior art experiments.1 23 Finally, the only evidence
that Cetus's interpretation of the prior art reference was inappropriate was Dr.
Kunkel's testimony that Cetus "knew better."1 24
The result in Hoffinann-La Roche is partly attributable to Hoffmann-La
Roche's failure to put forward evidence rebutting Dr. Kunkel's testimony.
25
Dr. Kunkel's testimony qualified as that of a PHOSITA. But an objective
recklessness standard calls for a thorough analysis of the PHOSITA's
understanding, one in which testimony that the inventor "knew better" fails to
clearly and convincingly prove that the inventor acted despite an objectively
high likelihood that his actions constituted failure to disclose material
information, or a submission of false material information. An objective
recklessness standard would produce a more equitable result in Hoffinann-La
Roche. If it failed to do so at the lower court level, such a standard would allow
a reviewing Federal Circuit panel to reverse a finding of inequitable conduct,
even operating under a deferential clearly erroneous standard of review.
D. Hoffmann-La Roche and KSR
After KSR, patent applicants face increased standards for nonobviousness
and will face an inevitable increase in examiner rejections. 26 Therefore patent
applicants will more frequently find themselves obligated to advance arguments
for patentability, similar to those advanced by Cetus in arguing for the
122. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the district court's analysis of
Example VI's accuracy).
123. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1371 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (denying any affirmative duty to replicate prior art experiments).
124. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Dr. Kunkel's testimony that
the Cetus inventor "knew better").
125. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1372 ("[Hoffmann-La Roche] did not put
forward evidence to contradict Dr. Kunkel .... We therefore have no evidentiary basis from
which to conclude that it was clearly erroneous for the district court to find that.., the
inventors [ ] intentionally sought to deceive the PTO.").
126. See supra Part II (discussing KSR and its effect on patent prosecution).
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patentability of its invention in Hoffnann-La Roche.12 7 This Note recognizes
that the patent rejected on obviousness grounds in Hoffnann-La Roche was a
biotech patent and that the effects of KSR may be felt more strongly in other
arts. 28 But the broader inequitable conduct issue at play in Hoffnann-La
Roche is relevant regardless of the art in question. Increased nonobviousness
standards mean more obviousness rejections, which in turn mean more
arguments for patentability. 29  And all arguments for patentability are
susceptible to hindsight criticism. 130  The Hoffmann-La Roche decision
encourages this Note to advocate the adoption of an objective recklessness
standard for inferences of intent to deceive not just for biotech patent
applications, but for patent applications in all the useful arts.
This Note further acknowledges that invoking KSR as justification for
adopting a higher standard for inferences of intent to deceive opens the door to
criticism claiming that this Note is inconsistent. KSR's increased standards of
nonobviousness are decidedly anti-inventor, and the standard espoused in this
Note is decidedly pro-inventor; however, this apparent inconsistency is without
substance. When a patent applicant crosses each patent law hurdle and meets
every patentability requirement, that patent applicant presumably has satisfied
KSR's anti-inventor standards and is therefore entitled to benefit from this
Note's pro-inventor standard. Patentees should not be deprived of their well-
earned rights by "[1]itigation-induced assaults on the conduct of science and
scientists.., intent on destruction of reputation and property for private
gain." 131 The patent system better protects the incentives to invent and to
commercialize when it "promote[s] and protect[s] a structure that fosters a
strong and vibrant environment for innovators,"'132 and an objective
127. See supra Part III.A-B (discussing Cetus's argument for patentability).
128. See MacKenzie, supra note 23 ("[KSR's] effect on litigation will vary depending on
the technology at issue."). "In mechanical cases... the claimed technology is easier to
understand and usually involves combinations of known prior art elements.... In chemical,
electrical, and biotechnology cases, a more in depth obviousness analysis may be needed since
predictability of results may not be easily apparent .... " Id.
129. See id. ("[N]o matter what technology is at issue, the Supreme Court made it
easier... to prove obviousness .... To overcome these rejections, [an] applicant will have
to... rely on declarations from the inventor or a person of ordinary skill in the art.").
130. See Wegner, supra note 23, at 6 n.13 ("[Iln hindsight, there can almost always be
some fact that can be portrayed as 'material' where minds could differ on what evidence should
have been included.").
131. Hoffrnann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
132. 153 CONG. REc. S15899 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (statements of Sen. Hatch),
reprinted in Leahy and Hatch Agree Patent Reform Must Come in Early 2008, AIPLA REP.
(Am. Intellectual Property Law Ass'n, Arlington, Va.), Dec. 21, 2007 (on file with the
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recklessness standard offers appropriate protection from opportunistic
inequitable conduct claims. Moreover, such a standard is in harmony with
recent developments in the Federal Circuit's willful infringement
jurisprudence.'3
IV. Lessons Learned from Willful Infringement Jurisprudence and
Suggested Patent Reforms
The Federal Circuit's In re Seagate134 decision is relevant to this Note's
analysis of inequitable conduct in two respects: (1) the Federal Circuit held
that "proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at
least a showing of objective recklessness"; 3 5 and (2) the Federal Circuit
"reemphasize[d] that there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of
counsel" to avoid an adverse inference with respect to willfulness. 136 The first
point, above, is relevant because the intent required for a finding of inequitable
conduct is analogous to the requisite finding of willfulness in willful
infringement suits. 137 The second point is relevant because it illustrates why
one commentator's suggested approach for avoiding inequitable conduct
allegations based on arguments for patentability is not advantageous.
38
A. Adopting Objective Recklessness
Both determinations of willfulness and determinations of intent involve
searching for evidence of scienter. The Federal Circuit's decision to adopt an
objective recklessness standard for inferring willfulness should motivate the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See infra Part IV (discussing recent developments in the Federal Circuit's willful
infringement jurisprudence).
134. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (overruling the standard
for determining willfulness set forth in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717
F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), and clarifying "the scope of the waiver of attorney-client privilege
and work product protection that results when an accused infringer asserts an advice of counsel
defense to a charge of willful infringement"). "Underwater Devices sets a lower threshold for
willful infringement that is more akin to negligence." Id. at 1371.
135. Id. at 1371.
136. Id.
137. See infra Part IV.A (discussing willfulness, intent, and the Federal Circuit's adoption
of an objective recklessness standard for inferences of willful infringement).
138. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the disadvantages in focusing on a patent attorney
obtaining a second opinion from a supervising, senior patent attorney).
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adoption of the same standard for inferring intent in inequitable conduct
analyses because asking whether an action was taken willfully is substantively
the same as asking whether the party in question intended to take such action.
"'Intent' commonly means: 'Design, resolve, or determination with which [a]
person acts[; a] state of mind in which a person seeks to accomplish a given
result through a course of action."" 39 Willful is often defined as deliberate,
voluntary, or intentional.140
In adopting an objective recklessness standard for willfulness, the Federal
Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court has concluded that "standard civil
usage of 'willful' includes reckless behavior."'14' The Federal Circuit
recognized that "the term reckless is not self defining," but the court noted that
a person is generally considered reckless when he acts in the face of an
unjustifiably high risk.' 42 Therefore, the Federal Circuit stated: "[T]o establish
willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent."
43
The Federal Circuit should adopt an analogous standard in the inequitable
conduct context. Doing so would provide that to establish intent to deceive the
PTO, in the absence of direct evidence of such intent, an accused infringer must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the patentee acted despite an
objectively high likelihood that his actions constituted either a failure to
disclose material information, or a submission of false material information.
Such a standard would discourage frivolous claims of inequitable conduct and
would help swing the Federal Circuit's inequitable conduct pendulum back
toward a truthful requirement of scienter and deceitful intent.' 44 Further, the
Federal Circuit can tailor the objective recklessness standard to be in harmony
139. 6 CHISuM oN PATENTS, supra note 8, § 19.03[4][g], at 19-318-19 (quoting Black's
Law Dictionary 810 (6th ed. 1990)).
140. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 339 (2d ed. 1989).
141. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
142. See id. ("The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts in the face of an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known."
(citations omitted)).
143. Id.
144. See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at I (discussing a "disturbing" trend in the Federal
Circuit's decisions indicating a decreasing standard for inferences of intent and a consequent
increasing readiness to find inequitable conduct). "When viewed over a period of decades, the
pendulum swings back and forth regarding the ease with which a finding can be made of
inequitable conduct.... The trend in recent decisions suggests that the pendulum is swinging
back" toward low standards for findings of inequitable conduct. Id.
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with patent law's frequently used PHOSITA standard. 145 This conservative
standard for finding inequitable conduct is consistent with recent congressional
suggestions for patent reform.
The Patent Reform Act of 2007'46 passed the House of Representatives in
2007, but failed to pass the Senate by the year's end. 47  Passage of
substantially the same bill stalled in the Senate once again in 2008.14' The
Patent Reform Act of 2007 added inequitable conduct as a defense to
infringement, amending the "Presumption of validity; defenses" section of the
Patent Act. 149 The bill increased the standard of proof for materiality by
providing that information is material if "a reasonable examiner would have
made a prima facie finding of unpatentability, or maintained a finding of
unpatentability, of one or more of the patent claims based on the information,
and the information is not cumulative to information already of record or
previously considered by the [PTO]."' 5'
The suggested new standard requiring proof of a reasonable examiner's
prima facie finding of unpatentability represents a higher standard for
materiality than that of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b),'' but the standard is easily met and
does little to raise the bar for findings of inequitable conduct post-KSR, when
the information at issue is likely to be advanced in arguments for patentability
145. An objective recklessness standard infused with an understanding of the PHOSITA
standard might be enunciated as follows: To establish intent to deceive the PTO, in the absence
of subjective evidence of such intent, an accused infringer must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the patentee acted in the face of what a PHOSITA would recognize as an
objectively high likelihood that the patentee's actions constituted either a failure to disclose
material information, or submission of false material information.
146. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by House,
Sept. 7, 2007) [hereinafter H.R. 1908] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. 153 CONG. REC. S 15899 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (statements of Sen. Leahy and Sen.
Hatch) (agreeing that patent reform should be introduced early in 2008 and recognizing that, in
2007, a number of Senate members were of the view that the Patent Reform Act of 2007 needed
to be perfected before it came to a vote), reprinted in Leahy and Hatch Agree Patent Reform
Must Come in Early 2008, AIPLA REP. (Am. Intellectual Property Law Ass'n, Arlington, Va.),
Dec. 21, 2007 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See generally Dugie Standeford, US Patent Reform Stalls as Senate Negotiations
Break Down, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.
org/weblog/index.php?p=1007 (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
149. See generally H.R. 1908, supra note 146, at 64-69; see also generally 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (2000) (providing the Patent Act's "Presumption of validity; defenses" section).
150. H.R. 1908, supra note 146, at 66.
151. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (providing the PTO regulation for
materiality).
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following examiner obviousness rejections. 52 The bill also explicitly addressed
the intent to deceive requirement for a finding of inequitable conduct. The bill
provided:
To prove a person with a duty of disclosure to the [PTO] intended to
mislead or deceive the examiner... specific facts beyond materiality of the
information misrepresented or not disclosed must be proven that establish
the intent of the person to mislead or deceive the examiner by the actions of
the person. Facts support an intent to mislead or deceive if they show
circumstances that indicate conscious or deliberate behavior on the part of
the person to not disclose material information or to submit false material
information in order to mislead or deceive the examiner.
53
The introduction of a conscious and deliberate behavior requirement
reflects a congressional intent to achieve a standard for intent to deceive that is
analogous to willfulness. Both "conscious" and "deliberate" are synonymous
with "willful,', 154 and the Patent Reform Act of 2007 included the conscious
and deliberate behavior requirement only after the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA) criticized both the initial Senate and House
patent reform suggestions for failing to advance a "knowing and willful
deception" standard for intent to deceive the PTO.'55 Following passage of the
Patent Reform Act of 2007 by the House, AIPLA did not object to the inclusion
of the conscious and deliberate behavior standard. 156  Presumably, that
commentator viewed the conscious and deliberate behavior to deceive standard
as equivalent to a "knowing and willful deception" standard.
While a standard requiring proof of "conscious and deliberate behavior"
certainly swings the Federal Circuit's inequitable conduct pendulum 57 back
toward higher standards for findings of inequitable conduct, it fails to achieve a
high enough standard. "[M]ore must be done to change the use of this defense
152. See id.; see also supra Part II (discussing increased obviousness standards post-KSR).
153. See H.R. 1908, at 67 (emphasis added).
154. See RoGET's INT'L THESAURuS § 380.08 (6th ed. 2001) (providing "deliberate,"
"conscious," and "willful" as synonyms for "intentional").
155. See Patent Reform Bills Await Action as Congress Recesses, AIPLA REP. (Am.
Intellectual Property Law Ass'n, Arlington, Va.), Aug. 7, 2007 ("The state of mind element for
both bills should be 'knowing and willful deception' rather than simply 'intentional
deception."') (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
156. See generally House Passes Patent Bill with Modifications, AIPLA REP. (Am.
Intellectual Property Law Ass'n, Arlington, Va.), Sept. 12, 2007 (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
157. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit's
inequitable conduct pendulum).
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as an unfair litigation tactic."' 8 Under the "conscious and deliberate behavior"
standard, arguments for patentability that arguably mislead examiners will meet
both the materiality and intent prongs of an inequitable conduct analysis.
Materiality may be presumed, 5 9 and arguing for patentability can only be done
consciously and deliberately. Such a standard fails to direct courts' attention to
finding either direct evidence of a subjective intent to deceive or the
recklessness from which such an intent may properly be inferred.
An objective recklessness standard for inferring intent would better reflect
the intentions behind the suggested inequitable conduct reforms and would be
recognizably analogous to the Federal Circuit's willful infringement
jurisprudence. 160  Moreover, an objective recklessness standard addresses
inequitable conduct, post-KSR, in a manner that avoids repeating mistakes that
the Federal Circuit's willful infringement jurisprudence has already struggled
with and overcome. One commentator has suggested that inequitable conduct
concerns surrounding the submission of patentability arguments can be
satisfactorily addressed by securing the opinion and approval of second, senior
patent attorneys.161 However, by placing significant emphasis on obtaining
second opinions, this suggestion risks imposing an obligation on patent
applicants, in the inequitable conduct context, that In re Seagate reemphasized
has been eliminated from the Federal Circuit's willful infringement
jurisprudence.
162
B. No Affirmative Obligation to Obtain Opinions of Counsel
After recognizing that, post-KSR, arguments for patentability advanced in
Section 132 affidavits or declarations will be used frequently to overcome
obviousness rejections and that such declarations provide fertile ground for
spurious claims of inequitable conduct, Professor Wegner suggests that patent
attorneys and agents prepare such declarations with the involvement of a
158. 153 CONG. REc. S15899 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(commenting on inequitable conduct reform), reprinted in Leahy and Hatch Agree Patent
Reform Must Come in Early 2008, AIPLA REP. (Am. Intellectual Property Law Ass'n,
Arlington, Va.), Dec. 21, 2007 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of materiality
for information advanced in arguments for patentability).
160. See generally In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
161. See Wegner, supra note 23, at 6 n.13 (advocating the acquisition of second, senior
patent attorney review).
162. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369-70 (reemphasizing that no adverse inference
should attach to a patent applicant's failure to obtain opinion of counsel).
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second, senior patent attorney. 161 Specifically, Professor Wegner suggests, "the
good faith effort involving multiple attorneys checking each other should
preclude a finding of mens rea--a necessary element to establish inequitable
conduct."164 But the adoption of such an approach to patentability arguments
risks leading inequitable conduct jurisprudence into a situation where a patent
applicant, patent practitioner, or patent agent's failure to obtain a secondary
expert opinion concerning information submitted to the PTO is viewed as
grounds for drawing an adverse inference with respect to intent to deceive the
PTO.
In the context of willful infringement, the In re Seagate decision
reemphasized that "an accused infringer's failure to obtain legal advice does not
give rise to an adverse inference with respect to willfulness."' 65 Before 2004,
the Federal Circuit "had held that an accused infringer's failure to produce
advice from counsel 'would warrant the conclusion that it either obtained no
advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its [activities] would be an
infringement of valid U.S. Patents."' "6 Deciding that such an adverse
inference was too burdensome on patent applicants and attorneys, the Federal
Circuit, in 2004, held that the failure to obtain opinion of counsel did not give
rise to an adverse inference with respect to willfulness.
67
In the inequitable conduct context, resorting to a system where arguments
for patentability must be checked by second, senior patent attorneys threatens to
push inequitable conduct jurisprudence into the morass from which the Federal
Circuit's willful infringement jurisprudence just emerged. A required second
level check on patentability arguments would likely foster extensive satellite
163. See Wegner, supra note 23, at 6 n. 13 ("Optimum declaration presentation should
involve a second, senior patent attorney to carefully make his own review.., to play devil's
advocate... and so forth.").
164. Id.
165. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370; see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme FuerNutzfahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding "that no adverse inference
that an opinion of counsel was or would have been unfavorable flows from an alleged
infringer's failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel").
166. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Knorr-Bremse,
383 F.3d at 1343).
167. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345-46 ("Although there continues to be 'an
affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others,' the
failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference
or evidentiary presumption that such an opinion would have been unfavorable." (citations
omitted)). In Knorr-Bremse the Federal Circuit cited Johns Hopkins University v. Cellpro, Inc.,
152 F.3d 1342, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998), "wherein the court held that to avoid liability for willful
infringement in that case, an exculpatory opinion of counsel must fully address all potential
infringement and validity issues." Id. at 1345.
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litigation concerning whether the failure to obtain a superior's review is proper
grounds for inferring intent to deceive the PTO. 168 Such a system would be
unduly burdensome on the patent application process and should be avoided to
steer clear of the same problems the Federal Circuit addressed in its willful
infringement jurisprudence.1
69
V. Applying an Objective Recklessness Standard
Two commentators cite Hoffnann-La Roche as evidence of a trend in the
Federal Circuit's jurisprudence toward a standard for inequitable conduct
determinations which "flies in the face of the clear-and-convincing standard
reiterated in Kingsdown and resurrects the inequitable conduct plague that
existed pre-Kingsdown.'0 70 The fact that the Federal Circuit affirmed lower
court findings of inequitable conduct in Novo NordiskPharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Bio-Technology General Corp.171 and Ferring B. V. v. Barr Laboratories,
Inc. 172 is further evidence of such a trend.173 Under an objective recklessness
168. Cf Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (noting that an adverse inference from failure to
obtain opinions of counsel in the willful infringement context led to extensive satellite
litigation).
169. Cf. id. (discussing the burdens of such a system and citing Johns Hopkins Univ., 152
F.3d at 1364, "wherein the court held that to avoid liability for willful infringement... an
exculpatory opinion of counsel must fully address all potential infringement and validity
issues").
170. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at 5. "The trend is away from the stricter standard of
Kingsdown, which required proof of scienter... and more toward a strict liability standard."
Id.
171. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1362-63 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court's holding that the patent at issue was unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct).
172. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming
the district court's holding that the patent at issue was unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct).
173. See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at 5 ("The theme of these decisions is that, once
materiality of information is found, the Federal Circuit is far more likely to infer an intent to
deceive... than it has in the past."). Hanfi and Kems also cite Kao v. Unilever, as evidence of
a trend away from Kingsdown. Id. at 4-5. In Kao, the Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court
determination that no inequitable conduct had occurred, but stated, "Given a blank slate, we
might weigh the evidence differently. Given the limited scope of our review, however, we
cannot second-guess the trial court's decision," implying that such a ruling was reached only as
a result of the Federal Circuit's applicable clear error standard of review. Kao v. Unilever, 441
F.3d 963,972 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Hanft and Kerns call the above language from the Kao decision
"ominous," and assert that it shows that "[w]hereas in the past, the lower courts were
encouraged to fight against the 'plague' of inequitable conduct charges. .. now the Federal
Circuit seems more eager to embrace anything that could resemble a mistake in prosecution."
1186
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT INEQUITABL YINFERRED
standard for inferences of intent to deceive, Novo Nordisk would be more
supportable and Ferring B. V. would be decided differently.
17 4
A. Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bio-Technology General Corp.
In Novo Nordisk, Novo Nordisk claimed priority for its invention based on
a patent application filed in 1983, 75 which contained a prophetic example that
was written in the past tense.176 Initially tense choice was not determinative in
this case. The district court found that the Danish inventor's 1983 submission
of the prophetic example partially written in the past tense "did not
intentionally breach his duty of candor and good faith" because his "'use of past
tense was merely an oversight... likely due to the fact that [he was] trained as
a scientist, not as a patent attomey familiar with the teachings of the MPEP."
77
But, in 1994, in attempting to establish priority during an interview with a
patent examiner, the Danish inventor and other representatives of Novo
Nordisk failed to disclose the true prophetic nature of the example from
1983.178 This nondisclosure was held to be grounds for a finding of inequitable
conduct. The Danish inventor was charged with knowledge of the law,
179
meaning he knew that prophetic examples should not be submitted in the past
tense, and, from this presumed knowledge of the law, both intent to deceive the
PTO and knowledge that the true prophetic nature of the example was material
were inferred.1
80
Hanfi & Kerns, supra note 57, at 5.
174. See infra Part V.A-B (applying an objective recklessness standard to Novo Nordisk
and Ferring B. V.).
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (providing the rule for claiming the benefit of an earlier
filing date).
176. Novo Nordisk, 424 F.3d at 1357.
177. Id. at 1361 n.12.
178. Id. at 1361.
179. See id. ("[The Danish inventor] was aware that Example 1 was prophetic, and because
'knowledge of the law is chargeable to the inventor,' and 'inventors represented by counsel are
presumed to know the law,' the district court's inference of deceptive intent was not clearly
erroneous." (citations omitted)).
180. See Hanfi & Kerns, supra note 57, at 3 (explaining why they disagree with the Federal
Circuit's reasoning in Novo Nordisk). Hanft and Kerns state:
What the Federal Circuit did was to charge knowledge of the law.., from the
attorney to the inventor, infer that the applicant "should have known" about the
materiality of the information, and then infer deceptive intent from that presumed
knowledge, in total disregard for the district court finding that the inventor had
acted innocently 10 years earlier in drafting the application.
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Bio-Technology General Corp. (Bio-Tech) would likely be hard-pressed to
show that the Novo Nordisk prosecuting attorneys were objectively reckless.
Under an objective recklessness standard for inferences of intent, Bio-Tech must
clearly and convincingly prove that, in failing to disclose the true prophetic nature
of the 1983 example in its priority-related interview, the Novo Nordisk
prosecuting attorneys acted despite what a PHOSITA would recognize as an
objectively high likelihood that such action constituted a failure to disclose
material information. In Novo Nordisk, "there was never a finding that the
inventor ever learned that tense could change the meaning of an example or that
the inventor ever disclosed the prophetic nature of the example to the [Novo
Nordisk] prosecuting attorneys."'18' Without any evidence that the Novo Nordisk
prosecuting attorneys knew that the example was prophetic, Bio-Tech will not be
able to clearly and convincingly prove that those attorneys argued for priority
despite an objectively high likelihood that such action constituted a failure to
disclose material information. It is not objectively reckless for prosecuting
attorneys to rely on a past-tense example that they have no reason to believe is
actually a prophetic example. Such reliance does not provide sufficient grounds
for inferring an intent to deceive the PTO. To decide otherwise would be to
entirely remove the ability of prosecuting attorneys to rely on past-tense examples.
Bio-Tech's case against the Danish inventor is stronger, but use of an
objective recklessness standard for inferring intent to deceive would result in a
more appropriate determination of intent than that which took place in Novo
Nordisk. The Federal Circuit noted, without disapproval, that the district court
found "the inequitable conduct intent requirement satisfied because 'Novo, nine
years after it first submitted [the example] to the PTO, knew or should have
known that the examiner would have considered the fact that [the example]
contained prophetic data important in evaluating whether [priority could be
claimed]."" 8 2 Such reasoning fails to properly treat materiality and intent as
separate elements of an inequitable conduct claim. Under an objective
recklessness standard, Bio-Tech would need to advance proof, most likely in the
form of expert testimony, that a PHOSITA would recognize that the inventor's
reliance on the example took place in the face of an objectively high likelihood
that such reliance constituted a failure to disclose material information. Bio-Tech
may have been able to carry this burden on the facts of Novo Nordisk,183 but an
181. Id.
182. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
183. See id. (emphasizing that the example at issue was not enabling). "We are not
prepared to accept the proposition that simply because fate interceded and Novo scientists
unintentionally [conducted the steps in the example after the example's submission], Novo
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objective recklessness standard would necessitate a thorough examination of both
the scientific accuracy of the example and the knowledge of a PHOSITA. Thus,
an objective recklessness standard would remain more loyal to the requirement
for scienter from which the reasoning in Novo Nordisk departs'84 and would result
in a more supportable inference of intent to deceive.
B. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.
In Ferring B. V., in response to an obviousness rejection and following an
examiner suggestion that "applicants obtain evidence from a non-inventor,"' 8 5 the
inventor submitted five Section 132 declarations arguing for patentability.8 6 The
Federal Circuit held that the submission of the declarations constituted intent to
deceive the PTO because four of the five declarations were written by scientists
with "intimate ties to the inventors of Ferring itself,"'18 7 and "it must have been
clear to [the inventor] ... that a non-inventor affidavit was sought for purposes of
obtaining objective evidence" of nonobviousness.188 As in Hoffnann-La Roche,
Judge Newman vigorously dissented from the panel majority's decision.189 In
inferring an intent to deceive from nondisclosure of the affiant scientists' Ferring
affiliations, the court stated that the inventor "should have known" that such
affiliations were material because he was "on notice that disinterested affidavits
were necessary."'190 Judge Newman attacked the majority's reliance on a "should
have known" standard as "bad law" contrary to Kingsdown.'9' She rebuked the
produced [the invention] according to the methodology of Example 1." Id.
184. See Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at 3 (noting that in Novo Nordisk "the court found
deceptive intent based on presumed knowledge of the law"). "[A]n inference [of intent to
deceive] based on a should-have-known standard... is not an inference based on circumstantial
evidence.... and does not meet the scienter requirement emphasized in Kingsdown." Id.
185. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
186. Id. at 1185.
187. See id. at 1190 ("[T]he district court was correct to conclude as a matter of law that
the examiners' request for non-inventor declarations was for declarations from individuals
without intimate ties to the inventors or Ferring itself."). "In sum, four of the five declarations
submitted to the PTO ... were written by scientists who had been employed or had received
research funds from Ferring." Id. at 1185.
188. Id. at 1186.
189. Hanft & Kerns, supra note 57, at 3. See generally Ferring B. V., 437 F.3d at 1195-
1205 (Newman, J., dissenting).
190. See Ferring B. V., 437 F.3d at 1192 (upholding the district court's determination of
intent).
191. See id. at 1202 (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing why it is inappropriate to rely on
precedent espousing a "should have known" standard).
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majority's reliance on a case overruled by Kingsdown and called it a "resurgence
of the plague that Kingsdown had intended to cure."'192 Summarizing the work
experience of the affiant scientists, Judge Newman believed that the panel
majority mischaracterized their connections with Ferring as "intimate ties," and
stated that the "inference that their scientific opinions may be biased and were
submitted with deceptive intent [was] a travesty."' 93
An objective recklessness standard for inferring intent to deceive would
likely lead to a finding that no inequitable conduct occurred in Ferring B. V. For
Barr Laboratories to prove that the inventor in Ferring B. V. was objectively
reckless, Barr Laboratories would have to show that, in failing to disclose the
affiant scientist's affiliations with Ferring, the inventor acted in the face of what a
PHOSITA would recognize as an objectively high likelihood that such action
constituted failure to disclose material information or a submission of false
information. The affiant scientists in Ferring B. V were well reputed professors.
It is unlikely that such distinguished affiants would deliberately conceal or submit
false information. 94 Moreover, as Judge Newman points out, "it is rare that any
scientist working in a specialized field would not have interacted professionally
with other scientists and with the industries in that field,"' 95 and "[t]here [was]
simply no evidence of any intention to withhold [the affiant scientists'
affiliations]; in fact, there [was] no evidence that [the inventor] even thought
about whether or not to disclose these affiliations, much less that he made the
deliberate decision to withhold material information from the PTO."'196 The facts
of Ferring B. V do not clearly and convincingly establish that there is an
objectively high likelihood that the inventor's submission of distinguished
scientists' affidavits, in response to a request for non-inventor affidavits, ran the
risk of constituting a failure to disclose, or a submission of false, material
information. Thus, an objective recklessness standard applied to the facts of
Ferring B. V produces a more palatable and equitable result and avoids the
danger of inferring both a patentee's knowledge of materiality and intent to
deceive from evidence the court decides the patentee "should have known."
'1 9 7
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1197-98.
194. See id. ("[T]he professors' reputations are enough, on the face of their scholarship, to
put into dispute the panel majority's summary judgment that they deliberately concealed
information that was important to the credibility of their affidavits.").
195. Id. at 1200. "Such relationships do not warrant an inference of bias and deception.
There must be evidence and analysis, not innuendo." Id.
196. Id. at 1198. The inventor only had knowledge of one of the affiant scientists'
affiliations, and this affiliation "was omitted from a declaration submitted after the relationship
ended and four years after the examiner's request for 'non-inventor' testimony." Id.
197. See Hanft & Kems, supra note 57, at 4 (discussing the Ferring B. V. decision). "[In
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VI. Conclusion
Allegations of inequitable conduct require close monitoring and scrutiny
because the "uncertainties," "vagaries," and "complexities" of the scientific
process and patent procedure combined with "the twists of hindsight" provide
fertile ground for such allegations'9" and because "[a] successful attack on the
inventor or his lawyer will destroy the patent, no matter how valid the patent and
how sound the invention."' 199 The Hoffnann-La Roche case illustrates that the
current state of the Federal Circuit's inequitable conduct jurisprudence fails to
provide inventors arguing for patentability with proper protection from
opportunistic, litigation-induced claims of inequitable conduct. After KSR, patent
applicants will argue for patentability more frequently than ever, leaving the door
wide open for allegations of inequitable conduct. Thus, the Federal Circuit must
adopt a higher standard for inferences of intent to deceive the PTO.
To establish inequitable conduct in the absence of direct evidence of a
subjective intent to deceive, an accused infringer must be required to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that a patentee acted objectively recklessly--that
the patentee acted despite what the person having ordinary skill in the art would
recognize as an objectively high likelihood that the patentee's actions constituted
either a failure to disclose material information, or a submission of false material
information. Such a standard is in harmony with Federal Circuit willful
infringement jurisprudence and consistent with recent congressional suggestions
for patent reform. Further, with this standard, the Federal Circuit can constrain
unwarranted findings of inequitable conduct, secure inventors' well-earned
property rights, effectuate patent incentive, strengthen technology-based
investment,200 and successfully give force to the constitutional command to
promote the progress of the useful arts.201
Ferring B. V.], the court used a should-have-known materiality standard and then further
inferred a specific intent to deceive from it.... When the inventor should have known, but did
not, the court inferred an intent to deliberately deceive the [PTO] ... ." Id.
198. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
200. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing the unreliability of patents, pre-Kingsdown, and noting that
"the contribution of a diminished patent incentive to the weakening of technology-based
investment was a serious national concern").
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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